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The Netflix Tax: Chicago’s Extension of Its Amusement Tax
To Include Electronically Delivered Entertainment Faces
Numerous Challenges And Sets the Stage For Taxing
on Streaming-Based Entertainment
Stephanie Cueman*
I. THE INTERNET AGE PRESENTS NEW AVENUES AND
CHALLENGES FOR CITIES AND STATES TO TAX CITIZENS
Americans have moved their lives onto the Internet.  We use the
Internet to connect with friends, share important (and trivial) life mo-
ments, order food, and entertain ourselves.1  The rise of Internet
streaming services, such as Netflix and Spotify, has meant the death of
many main street staples.2  Once omnipresent stores, like Blockbuster
or f.y.e., have all but disappeared.3  Americans are now consuming
entertainment through the Internet.  This move has caused devastat-
ing losses in tax revenue for cities and states around the country.4
Chicago, to raise revenue for a city plagued by budget problems, be-
gan taxing Internet-based streaming services.5
On June 9, 2015, Chicago adopted Amusement Tax Ruling No. 5 to
take effect on July 1, 2015; yet, companies did not have to start paying
* Stephanie Cueman is a J.D. Candidate, Class of 2017, at DePaul University College of Law
and Editor-in-Chief of the DePaul Business and Commercial Law Journal.  She earned a B.S. in
Entertainment and Arts Management with a concentration in Cinema and Television and minor
in Business Administration from Drexel University in 2013.  She would like to thank her family
for their unwavering support and encouragement.
1. See FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2017); INSTAGRAM, http://
instagram.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2017); GRUBHUB, http://grubhub.com (last visited Feb. 11,
2017); NETFLIX, http://netflix.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2017).
2. Abha Bhattarai, After 33 Years, Washington’s Last Video Store Closes Its Doors, WASH.
POST (Apr. 27, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/after-33-years-
washingtons-last-video-store-closes-its-doors/2014/04/25/49e82536-c1ad-11e3-b574-f8748871856a
_story.html?utm_term=.865ae1df0aba.
3. See FOR YOUR ENTERNTAINMENT, www.fye.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2017); BLOCKBUSTER,
www.blockbuster.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2017) (Blockbuster has closed all rental stores and
moved to a Blockbuster On Demand model).
4. See Mark Peters & Greg Bensinger, States Eye Taxes on Streaming Video and Cloud Com-
puting, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2015, 3:13 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/states-eye-taxes-on-
streaming-video-and-cloud-computing-1440095146.
5. Id.
159
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the tax until September 1, 2015.6  The ruling extends the tax to include
electronically delivered amusements.7  Chicago is one of the more re-
cent legislatures to explore the idea of taxing cloud-based streaming
services. Other states, including California, Vermont, Tennessee, and
Alabama, have explored the idea of taxing Internet services.8
In Chicago’s case, the language of the ruling states Chicago will tax
the companies that provided the amusement; unfortunately for con-
sumers, Netflix already confirmed it would pass the additional cost
onto consumers.9  Other companies affected by the tax are likely to
pass the burden to the consumers as well.  Through this extension,
consumers of streaming video, music, and gaming services now pay an
additional tax of 9% on their subscriptions.10  Chicago expects that
the tax will raise twelve million dollars a year.11  Almost immediately,
the amusement tax ruling was challenged in court by the Liberty Jus-
tice Center on behalf of Internet streaming service users in Chicago.12
At the time of publication, the suit against Chicago is currently
ongoing.
This Comment will explore Illinois’s home rule as it relates to
amusement taxes with a focus on the evolution of the Chicago Amuse-
ment Tax.13  It will look at the judicial response to past amusement tax
challenges to better understand the claims made against Chicago’s
amusement tax expansion to Internet streaming services and how past
precedent will weigh in the upcoming lawsuit.14  Additionally, this
Comment will examine how other state legislatures are dealing with
taxes on cloud-based streaming services.15
6. Chi., Ill., Dep’t Fin., Amusement Tax Rul. #5 (June 9, 2015), https://www.cityofchicago.org/
content/dam/city/depts/rev/supp_info/TaxRulingsandRegulations/AmusementTaxRuling_5_06_
09_2015.pdf; John Byrne & Amina Elahi, Chicago Extends Taxing Power To Online Movies,
Music, More, CHI. TRIB. (July 2, 2015 6:30 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/
breaking/ct-chicago-cloud-tax-met-0702-20150701-story.html.
7. Chi., Ill., Dep’t Fin., Amusement Tax Rul. #5 (June 9, 2015), https://www.cityofchicago.org/
content/dam/city/depts/rev/supp_info/TaxRulingsandRegulations/AmusementTaxRuling_5_06_
09_2015.pdf.
8. Peters & Bensinger, supra note 8; Mike McPhate, California Today: Fretting Over the ‘Net-
flix Tax’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28. 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/28/us/california-today-
netflix-tax-video-streaming.html?_r=0.
9. Chi., Ill., Dep’t Fin., Amusement Tax Rul. #5 (June 9, 2015), https://www.cityofchicago.org/
content/dam/city/depts/rev/supp_info/TaxRulingsandRegulations/AmusementTaxRuling_5_06_
09_2015.pdf.
10. Id.
11. Byrne & Elahi, supra note 6.
12. Complaint at ¶¶ 5-10, Labell v. City of Chicago, No. 2015-CH-13399 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 9,
2015), 2015 WL 5316414.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part VII.
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II. ILLINOIS’S HOME RULE IS KEY TO UNDERSTANDING WHAT
MUNICIPALITIES CAN TAX AS AN AMUSEMENT
The Illinois Constitution established home rule units.16  This grant
of power allows more autonomy in local governance.17  “If it is a local
issue that has not been pre-empted by the state, then it is likely that a
home rule unit has the authority to impose a regulation.”18  In Illinois,
home rule units can tax an amusement; however, the power is not
unlimited.
A. Home Rule Units in Illinois
To better understand how municipalities can impose taxes and the
legality of the amusement tax extension, one must understand the Illi-
nois “home rule unit.”19  Home rule units are counties with a chief
executive officer elected by the electors of the county and any munici-
pality with a population of more than 25,000.20  Home rule units “may
exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its govern-
ment and affairs including . . . to tax.”21  However, home rule units can
only license for revenue or impose taxes upon occupations if the Gen-
eral Assembly grants them the power.22  Without qualifying as a home
rule unit, a municipality can only exercise forty powers, and the rest of
the powers are retained by the state.23  Illinois authorized local munic-
ipalities to exert a broad range of powers associated with complete
self-governance.24  This power allows home-rule communities “to in-
cur debt, borrow money, or levy taxes” without a grant by the
legislature.25
Illinois home-rule municipalities have some of the broadest powers
in the United States.26  The Supreme Court of Illinois recently gave
home-rule municipalities a boost: unless the Illinois General Assem-
bly expressly exercises exclusive control over a particular subject mat-
ter of the law, municipalities may enact local ordinances with different
16. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
17. See CITIZEN ADVOCACY CTR., HOME RULE AND YOU 1 (2004), http://www.citizenadvoca
cycenter.org/uploads/8/8/4/0/8840743/homerulebrochure.pdf.
18. Id.
19. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
20. Id. § 6(a).
21. Id.
22. Id. § 6(e).
23. Joseph A. Kearney, Stubhub’s Tug at the Municipal Purse String: Why the Home-Rule
Taxing Powers Enumerated in the Illinois Constitution Must Remain Broad and Strong, 48 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 37, 40 (2014).
24. Id. at 43.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 38.
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requirements than the state statute.27  As Justice Kilbride stated in his
majority opinion, Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condo Ass’n,  for
the Illinois Supreme Court, “[h]ome rule is based on the assumption
that municipalities should be allowed to address problems with solu-
tions tailored to their local needs.”28
The Illinois General Assembly granted municipalities, like Chicago,
the ability to create their taxes.  Taxing is one power Chicago has not
been shy about exercising.  In 2016 alone, Chicago increased in prop-
erty taxes, taxi fares (by 15%), as well as, a new tax on electronic
cigarettes.29  However, the taxing power has limits.  The General As-
sembly has not granted municipalities the authority to enact a service
occupation tax.  A service occupation tax is imposed on sales transac-
tions other than sales of tangible property.30  Where a product and
service are provided together, the courts examine the totality of the
transaction to determine whether it can be taxed.31
B. Illinois Limits Municipalities’ Taxing Power
Illinois municipalities have no inherent power to tax amusements.32
The state legislature must give local municipalities the authority to
levy such taxes.33  Here, the Illinois General Assembly authorized mu-
nicipalities to impose their taxes on businesses.34  Specifically, “[t]he
corporate authorities of each municipality may license, tax, regulate,
or prohibit . . . theatricals and other exhibitions, shows, and amuse-
ments and may license, tax, and regulate all places for eating and
amusement.”35  Through this grant of power, municipalities, like Chi-
cago, can tax amusements.
Illinois municipalities have frequently exercised their right to tax
amusements.36  Chicago Code of Ordinances defines amusement as:
27. Adam W. Lasker, Home Rule Rules, Says the Illinois Supreme Court, 101 ILL. B.J. 278
(2013), http://www.isba.org/ibj/2013/06/lawpulse/homerulerulessaystheillinoissupreme.
28. Id.; see also Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condo Ass’n, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 29.
29. Hal Dardick, 2016 Brings Tax Hikes For Chicago, Cook County, City Schools, CHI. TRIB.
(Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-illinois-new-taxes-fees-
20151231-story.html.
30. See Commc’ns. & Cable of Chi., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Chi., 655 N.E.2d 1078, 1082
(Ill. 1995).
31. Id.
32. SANDRA M. STEVENSON, ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 64.22, at 4-64 (2nd ed.
2009).
33. Id.
34. Thomas P. Bayer et al., Finance and Tax, in MUNICIPAL LAW (ILLINOIS): FINANCING, TAX,
AND MUNICIPAL PROPERTY § 1.30 (2012) (ebook).
35. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-42-5 (2015).
36. See Chi. Health Clubs, Inc. v. Picur, 528 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Ill. 1988) (The original amuse-
ment tax was imposed on organizers of events. In 1980, the ordinance was amended and shifted
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(1) any exhibition, performance, presentation or show for en-
tertainment purposes, including, but not limited to, any theatrical,
dramatic, musical or spectacular performance, promotional show,
motion picture show, flower, poultry or animal show, animal act,
circus, rodeo, athletic contest, sport, game or similar exhibition such
as boxing, wrestling, skating, dancing, swimming, racing, or riding
on animals or vehicles, baseball, basketball, softball, football, tennis,
golf, hockey, track and field games, bowling or billiard or pool
games; (2) any entertainment or recreational activity offered for
public participation or on a membership or other basis including,
but not limited to carnivals, amusement park rides and games, bow-
ling, billiards and pool games, dancing, tennis, racquetball, swim-
ming, weightlifting, bodybuilding or similar activities; or (3) any
paid television programming, whether transmitted by wire, cable,
fiber optics, laser, microwave, radio, satellite or similar means.37
While this definition may seem all inclusive, Illinois courts have lim-
ited the extent to which municipalities may tax amusements.  The Illi-
nois Supreme Court previously held an extension of the amusement
tax unconstitutional when the tax was applied to health clubs and rac-
quetball clubs because the tax was a service occupation tax.38
III. HOME RULE UNITS’ TAX EXTENSIONS AND THE JUDICIAL
RESPONSE SO FAR: HOW FAR CAN THE
AMUSEMENT TAX REACH?
Illinois courts have answered many questions regarding home rule
powers and the types of taxes municipalities have imposed on its re-
sidents.  The following case studies illustrate exactly how the Illinois
courts have handled these issues.
A. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc. v. Picur
In Chicago Health Clubs, Inc. v. Picur, various health clubs in Chi-
cago brought suit against Chicago and city officials, including Ronald
Picur, in his capacity as Comptroller, challenging an amendment to
Chicago’s Amusement Tax Ordinance.39  The amendment at issue in
Picur was “any entertainment or recreational activity offered for the
public participation or on a membership or other basis including but
not limited to racquetball or health clubs, carnivals, amusement park
rides or games, bowling, billiard and pool games, dancing, tennis, rac-
the tax to patrons. Today, the tax is on patrons for the “privilege of witnessing, viewing or partic-
ipating is such amusements.”).
37. CHI., ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 4-156-010.
38. Picur, 528 N.E.2d at 984.
39. Id. at 979.
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quetball, swimming, weightlifting, body building or similar
activities.”40
The defendant argued that the amendment was an amusement tax
because it was imposed upon the patrons, as opposed to the operators,
of the health and racquetball clubs.41  However, the owners, opera-
tors, and managers were responsible for collecting and remitting the
tax.42  The Illinois Supreme Court found that a tax placed on the club
members is not dispositive of whether the tax is an unauthorized ser-
vice tax.43  The “mere recitation in the ordinance that the tax is upon
purchasers does not transform an occupation tax into a tax upon the
purchaser.”44  The court focused on the broad range of activities that
health clubs offered.45  In viewing the transaction as a whole, the
health clubs services were both “amusement” and “non-amusement,”
such as nutritional instructions, weight loss counseling, and weightlift-
ing and fitness classes.46  The court held taxing the membership fees
was not a tax on “amusements” or “places of amusements,” and there-
fore unconstitutional.47
B. Kerasotes Rialto Theater Corp. v. Peoria
Chicago is not the only city to grapple with courts over the defini-
tion of “amusement.”48  Movie theater owners in Peoria, Illinois also
challenged the Peoria amusement tax, which imposed a 2% tax on
movie theatergoers.49  The Illinois Supreme Court heard two issues in
the case: (1) whether the tax on the theaters was unreasonable, arbi-
trary, and unrelated to the purposed of the ordinance; and (2) whether
the city was engaging in intentional discrimination against the corpo-
rations.50  The corporations had to overcome a presumption favoring
the validity of classifications made by legislative bodies in taxing
matters.51
40. Id. at 980 (quoting Amusement Tax Ordinance).
41. Id. at 981.
42. Id. at 980.
43. Id. at 981.
44. Picur, 528 N.E.2d at 981-82 (quoting Commercial Nat’l Bank v. City of Chicago, 432
N.E.2d 227, 237 (Ill. 1981)) (internal quotations omitted).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 983.
47. Id. at 984.
48. See Kerasotes Rialto Theater Corp. v. City of Peoria, 397 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1979).
49. Id. at 791.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 792 (citing Williams v. City of Chicago, 362 N.E.2d 1030, 1035 (Ill. 1977)).
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Under the ordinance at issue, two categories were exempted from
the tax: non-profit organizations and schools.52  The court held that
burden of proof was on the theater owners to establish that the city’s
tax classification scheme was arbitrary and unreasonable and that the
city engaged in intentional discrimination against the theater owners,
neither of which they proved in this case.53  The evidence indicated
laxity in enforcing the statute, instead of intentional discrimination by
not collecting the tax from previously exempt corporations.54  The
amusement tax, in this case, was constitutional.55
Theater owners also argued the tax was an illegal occupation tax,
instead of an amusement tax.56  Home rule units do not have inherent
power to tax occupations; the General Assembly must grant home
rule units permission to levy occupational taxes.57  The court looked
to precedent and found, once again, that because the ordinance places
responsibility on the retailer for collecting and remitting the tax, it is
not dispositive that the tax is an occupation tax.58  The Peoria city
ordinance were not illegal occupation taxes.59
C. Communications & Cable of Chicago v. Department of Revenue
The Appellate Court of Illinois addressed the issue of what consti-
tutes a sufficiently pleaded complaint of an unauthorized tax.60  Chi-
cago cable companies brought suit against the Chicago Department of
Revenue claiming the Department of Revenue assessed an unautho-
rized transaction tax against the companies.61  The Department of
Revenue issued a notice of liability against the cable companies seek-
ing over $4.6 million in unpaid taxes, penalties, and interest.62  The tax
was assessed following the cable companies’ installation of telecom-
munications converters and remote control devices near customers’
televisions sets to enable better cable transmission reception.63  The
cable companies claimed this was unauthorized under the Chicago
Transaction Tax Ordinance and the home rule unit provision of the
52. Id.
53. Id. at 795.
54. Kerasotes, 397 N.E.2d at 794.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Commc’ns. & Cable of Chi., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Chi., 655 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995).
61. Id. at 1080.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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Illinois Constitution.64  On appeal, the court stated that “in order to
sufficiently claim a tax is ‘unauthorized by law’. . . the complaint must
allege that the tax itself was invalid, or that the assessor lacked author-
ity or discretion to impose the tax.”65  Since the cable companies suffi-
ciently alleged the tax was unauthorized under Chicago Municipal
Code § 3-32-030, the court was able to address both claims.66
The court pointed out that the Illinois Supreme Court determined a
taxation of commercial services constitutes an “occupation tax” which
does not fall under home rule unless sanctioned by the state legisla-
ture.67  “‘Service’ has been defined as all ‘sales’ transactions other
than sales of tangible property.”68  As Illinois courts address taxes on
Internet-based streaming services, they will have to determine if the
tax is on a service or tangible good.  Internet-based streaming services
will present a unique issue because the courts must examine the total-
ity of the transaction to determine its taxability as the product, in this
case, is provided in conjunction with a service.
D. The StubHub! Cases
The amusement tax took center stage again in 2010, this time re-
garding the Internet age.  Illinois enacted a statute that required elec-
tronic, web-based intermediaries either to “(1) collect and remit
amusement taxes arising from ticket resales from the individual ticket
resellers; or (2) publish a warning to prospective sellers on the website
that the seller’s failure to collect and remit applicable taxes could sub-
ject the seller to criminal and civil liability.”69  Chicago passed an ordi-
nance following the enactment of the state statute that required
electronic intermediaries to collect and remit the tax.70  The case
made its way to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Stubhub I);
however, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court of Illinois
never addressed the question of “whether [Illinois] municipalities may
require electronic intermediaries to collect and remit amusement
taxes on resold tickets.”71  The Seventh Circuit certified the question
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1081.
66. Commc’ns. & Cable of Chi., Inc., 655 N.E.2d at 1082.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing Waukegan Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 60 v. City of Waukegan, 447 N.E.2d 345,
349 (Ill. 1983)).
69. Kearney, supra note 23, at 38.
70. Id.
71. City of Chicago v. Stubhub, Inc. (Stubhub II), 979 N.E.2d 844, 845 (Ill. 2011).
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for the Supreme Court of Illinois to address in Stubhub II under Illi-
nois Supreme Court Rule 20.72
i. Stubhub I and the Internet Tax Freedom Act73
The City of Chicago brought suit against Stubhub, Inc. seeking a
judgment that Stubhub is responsible for collecting and remitting the
tax.74  The district court judge dismissed the claim as preempted under
Illinois’s Preemption Act.75  The case was appealed to the Seventh
Circuit where Stubhub asserted that the Internet Tax Freedom Act
blocks Chicago from imposing a tax on Internet auction sites.76
In evaluating if the tax was blocked under the Internet Tax Free-
dom Act, the Seventh Circuit analyzed if the tax was discriminatory.77
The Act “forbids ‘multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic com-
merce.’”78  Here, because the tax ordinance in question applied
equally to both ticket resales at physical auction houses and online
venues like Stubhub, the ordinance was not discriminatory.79  Since
Stubhub’s federal claims did not apply in this case, the Seventh Circuit
certified the state law claims to the Supreme Court of Illinois.80
ii. Stubhub II and the balancing of state and local
interests in taxing
In Stubhub II, the Supreme Court of Illinois set the standard of re-
view as a threshold question, in which it declares a subject off-limit to
local government control where the state has a vital interest and an
exclusive role.81  Stubhub was found to be a “reseller’s agent” within
the meaning of the Chicago ordinance.82  Chicago did not have to fol-
low common law agency principles and was free to define terms in its
codes.83  Since Stubhub provided services that help users sell tickets
and Stubhub is compensated for the services, it fit within Chicago’s
Municipal Code § 4-156-010 of a reseller’s agent.84
72. City of Chicago v. Stubhub, Inc. (Stubhub I), 624 F.3d 363, 367 (7th Cir. 2010); see also
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 20.
73. See infra Part IV.
74. Stubhub I, 624 F.3d at 365.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 366.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 367.
80. Stubhub I, 624 F.3d at 367.
81. City of Chicago v. Stubhub, Inc. (Stubhub II), 979 N.E.2d 844, 852 (Ill. 2011).
82. Id. at 850.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Next, the Illinois Supreme Court weighed the interests of the city
and state in its determination of whether Chicago had the ability to
force electronic intermediaries to collect and remit taxes.85  The court
held that even though the city has an interest in collecting its amuse-
ment tax, “the state has an interest in who does the collecting, which is
related to its vital interest in preserving and regulating the emerging
market for online ticket resales across Illinois.”86  Therefore, “Illinois
municipalities may not require electronic intermediaries to collect and
remit amusement taxes on resold tickets.”87
IV. HISTORY OF INTERNET TAX FREEDOM ACT AND THE FUTURE
OF THE PERMANENT INTERNET TAX FREEDOM ACT
The Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) was enacted in 1998.88
When enacted, ITFA set a three-year moratorium on discriminatory
taxes.89  Since 1998, ITFA was extended numerous times to keep the
moratorium active.90  Congress, however, recently passed, and Presi-
dent Obama signed into law, the Permanent Internet Tax Freedom
Act (PITFA).91  PITFA was initially introduced in September 2013 to
extend the original ITFA but did not pass because it was attached to
the controversial Marketplace Fairness Act.92  The ITFA sought to
create a federal policy that promotes the Internet as a tool for commu-
nication and trade.93  PITFA permanently extends a moratorium
where no state or political subdivision thereof may impose (1) taxes
on Internet access or (2) multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic
85. Id. at 853.
86. Id. at 853.
87. Stubhub II, 979 N.E.2d at 857.
88. Sally J.T. Necheles, Annotation, Construction and Application of Internet Tax Freedom
Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 note, 72 A.L.R. FED. 2d 283, § 1 (2013).
89. Id. at § 2.
90. Jeremy Bui, The Permanent Internet Tax Freedom Act, H.R. 3086, 113th Congress (2014),
23 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 528, 536 (2015); see John Eggerton, Groups Push for Permanent
Internet Tax Freedom Act, BROADCASTING & CABLE, (Jan. 21, 2016, 3:50 PM), http://www.broad
castingcable.com/news/washington/groups-push-permanent-internet-tax-freedom-act/147171
(The Marketplace Fairness Act allows for local taxation of online purchases.).
91. Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125, 130 Stat. 280
(amending 47 U.S.C. § 151 note (2012) to permanently extend the moratorium of the Internet
Tax Freedom Act) (as a result of the amendment the Act has now become known as the Perma-
nent Internet Tax Freedom Act); Patrick S. Campbell, President Signs Permanent Internet Tax
Ban into Law, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 2, 2016, 3:42 PM), http://www.lexology.com/library/de-
tail.aspx?g=d241fbfa-3f0a-4ecd-ae9a-7af255319062 (Seven states were “grandfathered” into the
INTA; but under PITFA, their exemption ends in 2020 and prohibit further Internet access
taxes. Illinois is one of the “grandfathered” state, but not for taxes on streamed goods.).
92. Bui, supra note 90, at 536.
93. Id.
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commerce.94   ITFA’s case law has mostly dealt with the taxing of In-
ternet access; there is not much case law on the prohibition of discrim-
inatory taxes on goods and services acquired through the Internet.95
Even though the Act does not bar taxes on goods and services sold via
the Internet, it prohibits a discriminatory tax from being imposed on
goods offered through the Internet.96  PITFA defines discriminatory
tax, in part, as a tax imposed on electronic commerce by a State or
political subdivision thereof that:
(i) is not generally imposed and legally collectible by such State or
political subdivision on transactions involving similar property,
goods, services, or information accomplished through other means;
(ii) is not generally imposed and legally collectible at the same rate
by such State or political subdivision on transactions involving simi-
lar property, goods services or information accomplished through
other means, unless the rate is lower as part of a phase-out of the
tax over not more than a 5-year period; [or]
(iii) imposes an obligation to collect or pay the tax on a different
person or entity than in the case of transactions involving similar
property, goods, services, or information accomplished through
other means.97
The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of discriminatory taxes
under the Internet Tax Freedom Act in Stubhub I.98  The defendants
claimed that Chicago’s amusement tax ordinance is superseded by the
ITFA; however, the court held that the tax was not discriminatory
under the meaning of the statute because the ordinance was applied
equally to ticket resales at physical auction houses, not just on the
electronic web-based resale sites.99  It is necessary to understand what
courts have interpreted as discriminatory taxes to analyze the chal-
lenge to Chicago’s amusement tax extension.100
94. Campbell, supra note 91.
95. Eriq Gardner, Chicago’s Tax on Netflix, Spotify Subscriptions Challenged in Court,
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Sept. 11, 2015, 6:48 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/
chicagos-tax-netflix-spotify-subscriptions-822122; see also Bui, supra note 90, at 537-38 (“For ex-
ample, Montana law states should the IFTA’s moratorium on Internet Taxation expire, Internet
access would be then taxed at 3.75%.”).
96. City of Chicago v. Stubhub, Inc. (Stubhub I), 624 F.3d 363, 367 (7th Cir. 2010).
97. Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1101(a), 112 Stat. 2681-719 (1998) (codi-
fied as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 note (2012)) (The reference to PITFA is actually a reference
to the Internet Tax Freedom Act adopted in 1998. PITFA was never adopted as it was proposed
to be, but the main part of it – permanent extension of the tax prohibition – was enacted as part
of an omnibus legislation and signed by President Obama.); Complaint, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 76-
77.
98. Stubhub I, 624 F.3d at 366-67.
99. Id.
100. See infra Part V.B.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\15-2\DPB203.txt unknown Seq: 12 19-JUN-17 13:06
170 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:159
V. IS CHICAGO’S TAX DISCRIMINATING AGAINST STREAMED
SERVICES?  ANALYSIS OF LIBERTY JUSTICE CENTER’S
FIGHT AGAINST CHICAGO’S AMUSEMENT
TAX EXTENSION
Liberty Justice Center (LJC) promptly filed a lawsuit after Amuse-
ment Tax Ruling No. 5 took effect in September 2015.101  LJC repre-
sents Chicago residents affected by the tax, including Michael Labell,
Jared Labell, Silas Pepple, Natalie Bezek, Emily Rose, and Bryant
Jackson-Green.102  Each of the plaintiffs has a subscription to an In-
ternet-based streaming service now taxed under the tax extension.103
LJC is a libertarian think-tank that describes itself as “a non-profit,
non-partisan litigation center that fights to protect economic liberty,
private property rights, free speech, and other fundamental rights in
Illinois.”104
“In order to sufficiently claim that a tax is ‘unauthorized by law’ . . .
the complaint must allege that the tax itself was invalid, or that the
assessor lacked authority or discretion to impose the tax as applied to
the taxpayers.”105  In its complaint, LJC alleges both.106  The com-
plaint alleges that the city of Chicago and the Comptroller exceeded
his authority in extending the tax to include streaming services.  Chi-
cago did not enact a new law in applying the amusement tax to
streaming services; but rather, it reinterpreted the old law to include
streaming services, and the measure was not voted on by the city
council.107  Additionally, LJC claimed the extension violated the
ITFA.108
A. Liberty Justice Center’s Claim that Chicago’s Comptroller
Exceeded His Authority By Extending Amusement
Tax Ruling No. 5
The lawsuit names Chicago and Dan Widawsky, in his official ca-
pacity as Comptroller of the City of Chicago.109  The complaint alleges
that Widawsky “exceeded his authority” when he reinterpreted the
101. See Complaint, supra note 12.
102. Id. at ¶¶ 5-10.
103. Id.
104. About: The Liberty Justice Center Mission, LIBERTY JUSTICE CTR., http://libertyjus-
ticecenter.org/about (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
105. Commc’ns. & Cable of Chi., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Chi., 655 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995).
106. See Complaint, supra note 12.
107. Gardner, supra note 95.
108. Complaint, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 75-86.
109. Id. at ¶ 16(A).
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definition of “amusement” in Chicago’s Municipal Code to include
“charges paid for the privilege to witness, view or participate in
amusements that are delivered electronically.”110  LCJ contends that
this tax should have been put to a vote to “let Chicagoans have their
voices heard through the democratic process.”111  The complaint lists
four separate counts.
LJC alleges in counts one through three that Chicago’s Comptroller
exceeded his authority by applying the tax to video, music, and
streaming services, respectively.112  The Comptroller is authorized by
the Chicago Municipal Code to “adopt, promulgate and enforce rules
and regulations pertaining to the interpretation, administration and
enforcement” of Chicago’s Amusement Tax.113  The complaint alleges
that Amusement Tax Rule No. 5 is inconsistent with or exceeds the
specific language in the ordinance that authorizes his rulemaking
power.114
Chicago only has the authority to tax what is expressly granted to it
in the Illinois Municipal Code.115  If the Comptroller levies a tax
outside the Code, he exceeds his authority.116  The Code grants Chi-
cago the right to “license, tax, regulate, or prohibit hawkers, peddlers,
pawnbrokers, itinerant merchants, transient vendors of merchandise,
theatricals and other exhibitions, shows and amusements and may li-
cense, tax, and regulate all places for eating or amusement.”117  The
Chicago Code of Ordinances initially defined amusement as “any ex-
hibition, performance . . . any paid television programming, whether
transmitted by wire, cable, fiber optics, laser, microwave, satellite, or
similar means.”118
Labell, through LJC, argues that until June 9, 2015, the definition of
amusement did not include video, audio, and gaming services
streamed from the Internet and provided to a customer on a com-
puter, mobile device, or other electronic devices.119  Now, under the
new definition, an “amusement” includes Internet-based streaming
services for video, audio, and gaming and Chicago residents are now
110. Id. at ¶ 16.
111. Jessica Corso, Chicago’s Internet Streaming Tax Is Illegal, Suit Says, LAW360 (Sept. 10,
2015, 4:14 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/701335 (quoting attorney for the plaintiffs, Jef-
frey Schwab).
112. Complaint, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 35-74.
113. Id. at ¶ 36.
114. Id. at ¶ 37.
115. STEVENSON, supra note 32, §64.22; 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-42-5 (2015).
116. See id.
117. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-42-5 (2015).
118. CHI., ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 4-156-010.
119. Complaint, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 40, 52, 64.
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taxed on “charges paid for the privilege to witness, view or participate
in amusements that are delivered electronically.”120
Further, the ordinance applies a nexus stating
because the amusement tax is imposed on the patron, and applies
only to activity (i.e., the amusement) that takes place within Chi-
cago, there is no question that the tax applies whenever the amuse-
ment takes place in Chicago.  The issue of nexus arises, at most,
with regard to the question of whether a given provider has an obli-
gation to collect the tax from its customer.121
In other words, the ordinance does not explicitly decide on how the
tax will be imposed on the consumer,122 though it will most likely be
added to the costumer’s subscription fee.123  Some see this as a way to
hold online businesses to the same standard as “bricks-and-mortar
stores in Chicago.”124  Chicago Alderman Pawar does not see this as
the Comptroller exceeding his authority at all.125  “He said the Eman-
uel administration has been clear that it was looking for ways to use
existing statutes to try to even the playing field.”126
According to LJC, the ordinance’s imposition of a tax on amuse-
ments “within the city” does not authorize a tax on Internet streaming
services.127  These services can be provided anywhere; however only
those with billing addresses in Chicago are subjected to the tax.128
Chicago residents living elsewhere are subjected to the tax, while
those living within the city limits with billing addresses outside Chi-
cago are free from paying the tax.129  This application differs drasti-
cally from the amusement tax placed on in-city physical vendors:
whether or not the purchaser is a Chicago resident, he must pay the
tax on the amusement enjoyed within the city limits.130  For example,
an Indiana resident that visits Chicago to see a musical will pay the tax
120. Chi., Ill., Dep’t Fin., Amusement Tax Rul. #5 (June 9, 2015), https://www.cityofchicago
.org/content/dam/city/depts/rev/supp_info/TaxRulingsandRegulations/AmusementTaxRuling_5_
06_09_2015.pdf.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Byrne & Elahi, supra note 6 (“A Netflix spokeswoman confirmed that the company will
pass the additional cost onto subscribers but said no other details were available.”).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Complaint, supra note 12, at ¶ 41.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Chi., Ill., Dep’t Fin., Amusement Tax Rul. #5 (June 9, 2015), https://www.cityofchicago
.org/content/dam/city/depts/rev/supp_info/TaxRulingsandRegulations/AmusementTaxRuling_5_
06_09_2015.pdf.
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on his ticket price.131  However, an Indiana citizen with a billing ad-
dress in Indiana but living in Chicago will not pay a tax on his Netflix
subscription.132
For LJC’s suit to be successful, it needs to persuade the court to
follow the Picur logic that Internet-based streaming services are a mix
of amusements and non-amusements.133  The court in Picur deter-
mined that the city was acting outside its scope of statutory authority
when it taxed memberships that covered a wide variety of amuse-
ments and non-amusements.134 Picur focused more on the services
offered at the health clubs than the goods being taxed.135  To convince
the court to follow the ruling in Picur, LJC’s argument must rely on
the services offered by Netflix, Spotify, Xbox and other streaming-
based services and the means in which the tax is assessed.136  The ser-
vice occupation tax is “imposed upon ‘all persons engaged in the busi-
ness of making sales of services’ and is measured by the cost of the
tangible property transferred as an incident to the sale of the ser-
vice.”137  However, as noted by amusement tax precedent, the collec-
tor of the tax is not dispositive of whether the tax is an occupation
tax.138  If the tax applied to the streaming services can be classified as
a service occupation tax, as the tax in Picur was classified, then the tax
will be held unconstitutional.  Service occupation taxes are not a
home-rule power.139  Therefore, municipalities cannot enact service
occupation tax.140  This case will turn on whether Netflix, Spotify, and
XBox are classified as services providers.
The arguments, in this instance, will rely on whether Internet-based
streaming services provide a good or service.  Under the Communica-
tions & Cable of Chicago test, Chicago will have a hard time applying
taxes to the services offered through the Internet.141  Home-rule
power grants municipalities the ability to tax tangible goods.142  The
amusement tax only applies to the streaming services, but not to ser-
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See Chi. Health Clubs, Inc. v. Picur, 528 N.E.2d 978, 983-84 (Ill. 1988).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 984.
136. Id.
137. Commercial Nat’l Bank v. City of Chicago, 432 N.E.2d 227, 234 (Ill. 1982) (citing Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1979, ch. 120, par. 439.103).
138. Kerasotes Rialto Theater Corp. v. City of Peoria, 397 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1979).
139. ILL. CONST., art. VII, § 6(e).
140. See STEVENSON, supra note 32, §64.22.
141. See Commc’ns. & Cable of Chi., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Chi., 655 N.E.2d 1078, 1082
(Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
142. Id.
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vices where consumers buy or rent films and albums through the In-
ternet.143  Arguably, the video-by-mail service does more to provide
the consumer with a tangible good than the streaming service because
consumers possess a tangible good, a DVD, at the end of the transac-
tion.  Courts have held that when a tax is meant to tax a service, as
opposed to a tangible good, the tax is held to be a service occupation
tax.144  Unless expressly sanctioned by the legislature, home-rule
power does not authorize Chicago to tax services.145
B. Liberty Justice Center’s Claim Under the Internet
Tax Freedom Act
LJC’s second argument claims the tax is barred under the Internet
Tax Freedom Act146 because this interpretation of the amusement tax
creates a discriminatory tax.147  The ITFA does not ban taxes on In-
ternet transactions; it merely regulates how taxes can be applied to
online transactions.148  Under ITFA, “no state or political subdivision
thereof shall impose . . . multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic
commerce.”149 The amusement tax is discriminatory in two ways: (1) it
does not apply to Netflix’s video-by-mail service and (2) the amuse-
ment rate is different for in-person live theatrical, live musical or
other live cultural performances.150
LJC’s claim depends on the interpretation of a discriminatory tax
under the ITFA, specifically Section 1105(2)(A)(i)-(ii).151  The amuse-
ment tax only applies to the services delivered electronically, but not
to services where consumers rent films through the Internet-based ser-
143. Chi., Ill., Dep’t Fin., Amusement Tax Rul. #5 (June 9, 2015), https://www.cityofchicago
.org/content/dam/city/depts/rev/supp_info/TaxRulingsandRegulations/AmusementTaxRuling_5_
06_09_2015.pdf.
144. See Chi. Health Clubs, Inc. v. Picur, 528 N.E.2d 978, 983 (Ill. 1988).
145. Id.
146. The Permanent Internet Tax Freedom Act was not enacted at the time LJC filed its
complaint. This section will be analyzed under the Internet Tax Freedom Act’s language.  Perma-
nent Internet Tax Freedom Act permanently extends the moratorium on Internet taxes.
147. Complaint, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 75-86.
148. City of Chicago v. Stubhub, Inc. (Stubhub I), 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010).
149. Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1101(a), 112 Stat. 2681-719 (1998)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 note (2012)) (The reference to PITFA is actually a
reference to the Internet Tax Freedom Act adopted in 1998. PITFA was never adopted as it was
proposed to be, but the main part of it – permanent extension of the tax prohibition – was
enacted as part of an omnibus legislation and signed by President Obama.).
150. Complaint, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 80-86.
151. Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1105(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
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vices.152  Additionally, though not raised by LJC in the complaint, the
tax ruling only applies to streamed content.153  The tax does not apply
when consumers permanently download movies or music through ser-
vices like iTunes or Netflix rentals-by-mail.154  Under the plain lan-
guage of ITFA, this is discriminatory because it imposes a tax that “is
not generally imposed and legally collectable by such State or such
political subdivision on transactions involving similar property, goods,
services, or information accomplished through other means.”155
Furthermore, in-person live theatrical, musical or other cultural
performances that take place in an auditorium, theater, or space that
does not exceed 750 persons is exempt from the statute.156  LJC ar-
gues that many theatrical, musical, or cultural events will be consumed
over streaming services; yet, they will not exceed 750 persons when
streaming entertainment in their homes.157  Under this interpretation
of the statute, the tax imposed on streaming entertainment is taxed at
a different rate than similar transactions through different means.158
ITFA explicitly states this is discriminatory.159
Stubhub I provides context for Illinois courts in determining if the
extended amusement tax is discriminatory or not.  Under the theory
of Stubhub I, a tax is not discriminatory if it is evenly applied to both
the Internet and physical locations.160  Through this interpretation, the
new amusement ruling is discriminatory.  Judge Easterbrook noted in
Stubhub I, “[t]he statute does not create ‘tax freedom’ for transactions
on the Internet but instead forbids ‘[m]ultiple or discriminatory taxes
on electronic commerce.’”161  In order to show the tax is discrimina-
tory, LJC needs to persuade the court that the amusement tax on
streaming services amounts to multiple and discriminatory taxes.162
The tax is not evenly applied to all rental services or means of en-
tertainment consumption. Stubhub I’s determination turned on the
152. Chi., Ill., Dep’t Fin., Amusement Tax Rul. #5 (June 9, 2015), https://www.cityofchicago
.org/content/dam/city/depts/rev/supp_info/TaxRulingsandRegulations/AmusementTaxRuling_5_
06_09_2015.pdf.
153. Id.
154. Michael H. Wynne et al., The Staggering Breadth of Chicago’s New ‘Cloud’ Tax, LAW360
(June 24, 2015).
155. Internet Tax Freedom Act  § 1105(2)(A)(i).
156. CHI., ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 4-156-020(e).
157. Complaint, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 75-86.
158. Id.
159. Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1105(2)(A)(ii).
160. City of Chicago v. Stubhub, Inc. (Stubhub I), 624 F.3d 363, 367 (7th Cir. 2010).
161. Id. at 366.
162. Id.
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equal applicability of the ordinance.163 “Because the ordinance ap-
plies equally to ticket resales at physical auction houses, the Chicago
Board of Trade, and venues such as Stubhub the tax is not ‘discrimina-
tory.’”164  LJC claim rests on the tax not applying evenly to online and
physical amusements because small theaters are taxed at a different
rate than electronically delivered content.165  Because the tax does not
apply to Netflix’s video-by-mail service, along with a higher tax rate
on theatrical, musical, and cultural performances streamed than per-
formances that are consumed in person, it is a discriminatory tax
under ITFA.
One interesting note in LJC’s complaint is that the amusement tax
provides an exemption for live musical or other live cultural perform-
ances in auditoriums or theaters with a capacity of less than 750 per-
sons.166  It is unclear how the court will have to deal with a tax
exemption.  The Illinois Supreme Court addressed exemptions to the
amusement tax in Kerasotes Rialto Theater Corp. v. Peoria; however,
that case happened well before the Internet age.167  While the Ker-
asotes court held that legislative bodies have broad powers to create
certain classifications in a taxation scheme, the classifications in ques-
tion in Amusement Tax Ruling No. 5 are likely not within Chicago’s
legislative power because it creates a discriminatory scheme on
streamed Internet content.168  The Stubhub I court did not have to
look at this issue as it relates to the ITFA because the ordinance in
question did not give an exception.169
ITFA case law has mostly been applied to online hotel-booking
sites.170  The Act is often used as invoked against city or state ordi-
nances attempting to tax goods or services on the Internet.171  For the
most part, the ordinances were not preempted by ITFA.172  Since the
enactment of PITFA, not many cases have challenged state or local
tax ordinances.  The recent permanent extension to the discriminatory
163. Id. at 367.
164. Id.
165. Complaint, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 75-86.
166. Id.; see also CHI., ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 4-156-020(e).
167. Kerasotes Rialto Theater Corp. v. City of Peoria, 397 N.E.2d 790, 791 (1979).
168. Id. at 792.
169. City of Chicago v. Stubhub, Inc. (Stubhub I), 624 F.3d 363, 367 (7th Cir. 2010).
170. See District of Columbia v. Expedia, Inc., 2012 D.C. Super. LEXIS 14 (D.C. Super. Ct.
2012); Village of Rosemont v. Priceline.Com Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119231 (N.D. Ill. 2011)
171. See Stubhub I, 624 F.3d 363; Expedia, Inc., 2012 D.C. Super. LEXIS 14; Priceline.Com
Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119231.
172. See id. [Courts have viewed such ordinances as a way to stop online agents from evading
taxes that physical agents must pay].
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tax moratorium under PITFA may bring more cases to the courts,
starting with Labell v. City of Chicago.
VI. ARE THE DAYS OF TAX-FREE INTERNET STREAMING COMING
TO AN END THANKS TO CHICAGO?
The decline of DVD and CD sales in the past decade has caused a
decrease in revenue for cities and states.173  In the previous ten years,
both DVD/Blu-ray and video game sales and rentals have dropped by
nearly fifty percent.174  The decline in sales of DVD/Blu-ray, video
games, and CDs has caused states to lose an estimated $1 billion in tax
revenue.175  Sales tax is applied to tangible items, such as DVDs, CDs,
and video games.176  Taxes, however, have been levied on some online
purchases.177  Goods purchased through Internet-based marketplaces,
such as Amazon or eBay, are taxed according to state sales tax.178  It
seems that the next logical step for states to recover this lost revenue
is to move into the Internet-based streaming services.179
A. Compliance Costs Create a Barrier to Entry for Consumers
and New Services
For the consumer, the monthly subscription cost will rise as these
services pass the tax onto consumers.  A family subscription to Netflix
in Chicago will now cost a family over $13 per month.180  At over $156
per year, this could be enough to drive some families out of the mar-
ketplace for the streamed content.  The taxes begin to add up with
subscriptions to multiple services.  Internet-based streaming services
were once seen as a less expensive alternative to cable,181 but as taxing
regimes catch up to streaming, these will be regarded as a luxury item
for many families.  If other Internet-based streaming services also pass
173. Peters & Bensinger, supra note 4.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. See Betty Liu, Why Chicago Is Being Sued Over ‘Netflix Tax’, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 14,
2015, 11:25 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2015-09-14/why-chicago-is-being-sued-
over-netflix-tax-.
179. Id.
180. See Rachel Grozanick, How Much Does Netflix Cost These Days? Here the Lowdown,
DIGITAL TRENDS (May 14, 2016, 5:00 PM), http://www.digitaltrends.com/movies/netflix-cost-
pricing-plan-breakdown.
181. See Jason Henry, Pasadena Will Tax Netflix, Hulu and Your City Might Be Next,
PASADENA STAR-NEWS (Sept. 23, 2016, 5:08 PM), http://www.pasadenastarnews.com/govern
ment-and-politics/20160923/pasadena-will-tax-netflix-hulu-and-your-city-might-be-next.
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the tax onto the consumer, these services might see drastic drops in
subscriptions simply due to the rising costs.
Chicago’s amusement tax “applies only to activity (i.e., the amuse-
ment) that takes place within Chicago.”182  For patrons attending a
live event, it is easy to determine if the event falls within the city lim-
its.  However, Internet-based streaming services can be streamed any-
where.  This raises issue of a nexus within the city.183  The amusement
tax ruling seems to skirt the issue of nexus.184  “The issue of nexus
arises, at most, with regard to the question of whether a given pro-
vider has an obligation to collect the tax from its customer.  That issue
is beyond the scope of this ruling.”185  Providers, however, may begin
collecting the tax despite lacking a sufficient nexus to the City of Chi-
cago.186  Only consumers paying for these services with a Chicago bill-
ing address will have to pay the tax.187  If other municipalities in
Illinois do not adopt the tax, consumers might begin shopping for
favorable billing addresses.
Internet-bases streaming services will face another hurdle if other
states and municipalities begin implementing different taxes.  Cur-
rently, Netflix has three different streaming packages, based on the
number of screens a customer needs.188  The monthly price ranges
from $8 to $12 depending on which package the customer chooses.189
Since Netflix’s streaming service has not been previously taxed, the
rates are consistent to consumers across the country.190  However, as
states begin setting different tax rates, it will be on Netflix, and similar
services, to assess and collect the various taxes, thereby increasing the
compliance costs of streaming services.191  Internet-based streaming
182. Chi., Ill., Dep’t Fin., Amusement Tax Rul. #5 (June 9, 2015), https://www.cityofchicago
.org/content/dam/city/depts/rev/supp_info/TaxRulingsandRegulations/AmusementTaxRuling_5_
06_09_2015.pdf.
183. See Wynne et al., supra note 154.
184. Chi., Ill., Dep’t Fin., Amusement Tax Rul. #5 (June 9, 2015), https://www.cityofchicago
.org/content/dam/city/depts/rev/supp_info/TaxRulingsandRegulations/AmusementTaxRuling_5_
06_09_2015.pdf [The Amusement Tax Ruling states that the issue of nexus “is beyond the scope
of this ruling, and any provider with a question about that topic should consult its attorneys.”
Effectively, the ruling imposes on the provider to disprove a nexus.]
185. Id.
186. Wynne et al., supra note 154 (“[O]nce the department begins to audit and assess custom-
ers located within the city, many of those customers are likely to demand that providers collect
the tax going forward.”).
187. Id.
188. Grozanick, supra note 180.
189. Id.
190. See id.
191. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC ISSUES IN TAXING INTERNET AND MAIL-ORDER
SALES 9 (2003).
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services that engage in business nationwide could deal with more than
6,000 tax regimes across state and municipal ordinances.192  Compli-
ance with taxing regimes could potentially cause the base prices of
these services to rise to accommodate the calculations.  Even more
worrisome, a start-up streaming service could also see the different
taxing regimes as a barrier to entry into the market.
However, not all cities across the country will be able to follow Chi-
cago’s lead in taxing Internet-based streaming services.  Illinois home-
rule powers are among the broadest in the nation.193  Not all state
legislatures will grant this vast power to their municipalities.  Instead,
some states may keep the power for themselves and apply the tax
evenly across the state.194   Tax extensions to Internet services could
very well be the next hotly litigated issue across the country under
PITFA.
B. States Vary in Response to Taxing Internet-based Streaming
Services or Cloud-based Services Thus Far
States have differed in their approach to tapping into this potential
tax gold mine.195  With Chicago alone standing to gain $12 million a
year in tax revenue from its extended amusement tax, other states will
likely want to capitalize on this significant of an increase in tax reve-
nue.196  So far, states have mixed results in the application of their
proposed Internet or cloud-based taxes.197  Not all states are using an
amusement tax like Chicago; Pennsylvania uses a sales tax, and Cali-
fornia uses a utility tax on streaming services.198  Notably, Vermont
chose not to tax cloud-computing services because the technology was
more of a service than a good.199
192. Id. at vii.
193. Kearney, supra note 23, at 38.
194. See TENN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, ARE STREAMING MOVIES, EBOOKS AND DOWNLOAD-
ABLE MUSIC SUBJECT TO TAX? (2015), https://revenue.support.tn.gov/hc/en-us/articles/2048987
59-Are-streaming-movies-eBooks-and-downloadable-music-subject-to-tax-.
195. See id.
196. Byrne & Elahi, supra note 6.
197. See id. (“Tennessee extended its 7% sales tax to software and digital games that are
accessed remotely. . . . But Alabama lawmakers recently shelved its own ‘Netflix tax.’”).
198. Henry Grabar, The Netflix Tax Is Coming, and Why Not?, SLATE (Sept. 27, 2016, 3:32
PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2016/09/27/netflix_taxes_have_grown_popular_in_
states_and_cities_as_entertainment_moves.html.
199. Nat Rudarakanchana, Lawmakers Vote To End Moratorium on Cloud Computing Tax,
VTDIGGER (May 14, 2013, 8:50 PM), http://vtdigger.org/2013/05/14/lawmakers-vote-to-end-mor-
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State taxing power differs from the federal government’s power to
tax.200  States have been able to levy taxes, and survive commerce
clause challenges, where they have a substantial nexus.201  States
“have sustained a tax against Commerce Clause challenge when the
tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing
State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the
state.”202  As long as a state tax on Internet-based streaming services
is not discriminatory under the Permanent Internet Tax Freedom Act,
the tax will likely fit within the state’s ability to levy taxes, much like
state sales taxes apply to goods purchased over the Internet.
i. California
Cities across California instituted taxes on streaming services.203
The tax rate will vary by city, ranging from 4.5% to 11%.204  Califor-
nia cities are applying the tax using the cities’ existing tax rate for
cable providers.205  “As companies begin to provide services that look
more and more like cable services, those fall under taxable ser-
vices.”206  Consumers who get video through cable television are
taxed, but those who use Internet streaming services were not sub-
jected to the same tax.207  Currently, California’s tax only applies to
video streaming services, such as Hulu, Netflix, Amazon Video, and
HBO.208  The tax does not include music or video game services.209
The taxing schemes throughout California may face legal challenges
as well.  “In California, voters are the only ones who can increase their
taxes, but in this case, Pasadena and other cities are saying previous
votes already included these services.”210  The tax, however, had not
been collected on these services until now.211  Some of the tax ordi-
nances in question were purposefully left open-ended to tax video ser-
vice suppliers “whatever their technology.”212  Don Maynor, an
200. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
201. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
202. Id.
203. See Henry, supra note 181.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. McPhate, supra note 8.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Henry, supra note 181.
211. Id.
212. Id. (quoting an amendment to Pasadena city ordinance).
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attorney for MuniServices,213 noted there is no way to write ordi-
nances today to know how technology will look down the road.214
Maynor stated, “[t]he goal is to treat everyone the same, regardless of
technology.”215  The Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association is looking
into potential legal challenges to the tax, noting that if it is an exten-
sion then under California’s constitution, the tax needs voter
approval.216
ii. Alabama
Alabama’s “rental tax” is not new.217  Traditionally the tax was ap-
plied to video store rentals and put on each transaction.218  To make
up for the lost revenue, Alabama Department of Revenue (ADOR)
proposed some new ideas.219  One idea included taxing “digital trans-
missions,” where cable customers will be taxed for movies and televi-
sion shows accessed on-demand through their digital video recorders
(DVR).220  “The [Alabama] Legislative Council has the ability to re-
ject any propos[al by the Department of the Revenue].”221  The State
Legislature sent a letter to ADOR expressing its disapproval with the
tax and effectively halting the ADOR from taxing DVRs and multi-
purpose cable boxes that function as DVRs.222
While the legislature has fought back on the tax, the ADOR claims
this is not a new tax and well within their authority to enact.223  “Com-
missioner Magee is responding to those lawmakers on the Legislative
Council, saying the Alabama Code allows the definition of ‘tangible
personal property’ to be expanded to streamed content.”224  The Ala-
bama Rental Tax defines “tangible personal property” as “anything
which may be ‘seen. . . or otherwise perceptible to the senses.’”225
213. See id. (MuniServices is the company that collects the taxes for some California
municipalities.).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Henry, supra note 181.
217. Elizabeth Beshears, Alabama Dept. of Revenue Leader Attempts to Defend Netflix Tax,
YELLOWHAMMER (July 2, 2015, 12:56 PM), http://yellowhammernews.com/politics-2/alabama-
dept-of-revenue-leader-attempts-to-defend-netflix-tax.
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Since digital media can be seen and perceptible to the senses, it fits
within the definition of tangible personal property.226
The proposed tax expansion in Alabama caused a heated discus-
sion.  The President and CEO of the Business Council of Alabama
weighed in and claimed the proposed regulation exceeds ADOR’s au-
thority.227  Even after the back and forth between the Alabama De-
partment of Revenue and the Alabama Legislature, the rental tax has
not been expanded to include content accessed on-demand through
DVRs.228
iii. Tennessee
Unlike its neighbor, Tennessee has no qualms about extending its
taxing scheme.229  In 2015, Tennessee extended its 7% sales tax to
software and digital games accessed remotely.230  “The sale, lease, li-
censing and use of digital audio-visual works, digital audio works and
digital books are subject to sales and use tax.  This group of products
is referred to in the law as specified digital products.”231  In addition
to the 7% state tax rate, the specified digital goods are subject to a
standard local tax rate of 2.5%.232
iv. Idaho
In 2015, Idaho clarified its statute on digital goods.233  The amended
law states that streaming services are not subject to tax.234  The Idaho
sales and use statute took the opposite approach than the Chicago
Amusement Tax Extension.  Sales and use taxes apply to “digital
goods when the purchaser acquires the permanent right to use the
digital goods.”235  This tax would include permanent downloads
bought from services like Amazon or iTunes.236  It does not apply to
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Beshears, supra note 221.
229. Peters & Bensinger, supra note 8.
230. Id.
231. TENN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 194.
232. Id.
233. Jennifer Jensen, US – The Disparate State and Local Tax Treatment of Digital Streaming
Services, PWC (Sept. 9, 2015), http://ebiz.pwc.com/2015/09/us-the-disparate-state-and-local-tax-
treatment-of-digital-streaming-services-2.
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236. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\15-2\DPB203.txt unknown Seq: 25 19-JUN-17 13:06
2017] THE NETFLIX TAX 183
streaming services, like Netflix or Hulu.237  However, the tax does not
apply when the right to use is temporary, like in streaming services.238
v. Vermont
Vermont flirted with the idea of taxing cloud-computing services.
In 2010, Vermont’s tax department levied retroactive sales taxes on
businesses that used cloud-computing services.239  But, the software
and technology industries successfully lobbied for a moratorium on
the taxes that extended until July 2013.240  The Wall Street Journal
reported in 2015 that Vermont will not tax cloud computing because
technology is more of a service than a tangible good.241
VII. CONCLUSION
Taxes on movie tickets and cable are not new.  But in today’s world,
most consumers are moving to the Internet to find their entertain-
ment.  This move leaves states that depend on tax revenue struggling
to keep up in the digital age.  As the shift from tangible goods to
streaming services continues, cities and states will continue to try to
find a way to make up for lost revenue.242
Chicago Amusement Tax Ruling No. 5 is currently being challenged
in court.  The suit is still in the pleading stages, but as it moves for-
ward the court will have to determine many complicated issues.  At
the heart of the complaint is Illinois home rule power and federal pre-
emption under the Internet Tax Freedom Act.  The courts must decide
if the tax extension taxes services or goods before it can determine the
constitutionality of the tax under the home rule unit provision in the
Illinois Constitution.  Chicago will also have to show that it is not dis-
criminating against Internet-based streaming services and that its tax
is applied evenly to the Internet and physical taxes to survive its chal-
lenge under the Internet Tax Freedom Act.  If this tax is constitu-
tional, other municipalities in Illinois are likely to enact their taxes on
Internet-based streaming services.
As states enacting streaming taxes or expand existing ordinances to
include the services, compliance costs will burden the services.  Differ-
ing taxing regimes will potentially deter new streaming services from
entering the market.  Additionally, families and individuals that relied
237. Byrne & Elahi, supra note 6.
238. Jensen, supra note 233.
239. Nat Rudarakanchana, supra note 199.
240. Id.
241. Peters & Bensinger, supra note 8.
242. Id.
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on the services may no longer be able to afford them.  Subscriptions
could begin to fall as states start taxing the services.
So far, states have had very mixed reactions to taxing streamed con-
tent, but the issue is gaining popularity with California also taxing
streamed services under its utility tax.  While the Alabama legislature
fiercely opposes a tax on streamed content, Tennessee expanded their
sales tax to include streamed content.  Idaho, on the other hand,
amended its statute to ensure that streamed services are not subject to
tax.  The sources of revenue from these taxes appear to be very lucra-
tive.  Only time will tell the future of taxing Internet-based streaming
services.
